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Preface
This study represents an attempt to determine to what degree
well-meant labor market policies negatively influence employment
and hence unemployment levels. To do this a survey - referred to
hereafter as the Labor Code Survey (LCS) - of firms in Panama was
carried out. This survey is unique not only for Panama - such a
broad-based attempt to analyze the impact of labor market regula-
tions has not been carried out anywhere else. The study as it
stands, however, is not considered by the author to be complete,
as neither the entire depth of the information gathered for the
project could be presented here, nor are possible issues from the
employees' side explicitly covered in this approach. The author
would thus welcome comments on issues which could be analyzed
further and criticism of aspects neglected or overly stressed.
Needless to say this study - carried out for the "Economic Stu-
dies Program" under the auspices of US AID/Panama - would not
have been possible without the cooperation and assistance of many
people in the Republic of Panama. First and foremost are Isabel
Atencio and Andrea Butelman who suffered through the tedious and
frustrating work of making sure that the survey was answered and
who sifted through various mounds of documents and data to ful-
fill my requests. Thanks to their tenacity and diligence the
study could be completed. Furthermore, Marco Fernandez, Juan Luis
Moreno, John Panzer, Pedro Videla and Daniel Wisecarver all pro-
vided valuable assistance and suggestions whenever problems
arose. Of particular importance to me as an economist were the
discussions with Jorge Fabrega, Arturo Hoyos and Yauda Kuzniecky
- all of "them helped to contribute to my better understanding of
the Labor •Code. Last but not least, the author would like to
thank the 54 companies which replied - without the work they
invested in answering the survey this study would have produced
less meaningful results. Back in Kiel the author would like to
thank Juergen B. Donges, Egbert Gerken and Herbert Giersch for
worthwhile discussions on various aspects touched upon in this
paper. The author exonerates all of those mentioned above from
any possible errors or omissions and accepts - albeit grudgingly
- responsibility for them.
References made to the Labor Code in this study refer to the
English version published by the ILO (Legislative Series, 1971 -
pan.). Interpretation of the Code was made with the help of Artu-
ro Hoyos' article on Panama in the International Encyclopedia of
Labor Law and Industrial Relations (R. Blanpain (Ed.), Nether-
lands, 1979). For more detailed information on the labor market
in Panama readers are referred to two other studies within the- II -
framework of the Economic Studies program: Andrea Butelmann and
Pedro Videla "El Codigo de Trabajo y sus efectos sobre salarios y
empleo" (November, 1984); Pedro Pou "Empleo, inversion y creci-
miento economico en Panama durante la decada de los setenta"
(July, 1984) . These are complemented by the 1982 World Bank re-
port on urban unemployment as well as the 198 4 country report. A
good overview of the economy up to the mid-seventies is given by
Robert Looney ("The Economic Development of Panama - the Impact
of World Inflation on an Open Economy". New York, 1976).
Dean Spinanger
Kiel, Germany
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73Chapter I - Employment Problems in Panama - Issues, Approach
and Overview
1. Introduction and Relevance
The purpose of this part of the Economic Policy Studies Pro-
gram is to analyze employment problems in Panama, determine
their causes and formulate strategies to resolve or at least
mitigate them. Urgency in this matter is called for. Already
unemployment is at its highest level in decades and new em-
ployment opportunities in the private sector are being created
at but a very sluggish pace. Since this constellation alone
would dictate prompt action, the fact that by the end of the
decade there will be over a third of a million more people of
working age in Panama than at the beginning, accentuates the
urgency of the situation. If this potential growth in the
labor force is not to exacerbate employment problems in the
coming years, thereby nurturing social injustice and unrest,
effective and forceful measures are required once the actual
causes of the problems have been identified.
The specific approach taken in this study attempts to do
justice to the task by concentrating on what is perceived to
be the crux of the problem - namely on barriers in the labor
market which keep the unemployed, underemployed or new
entrants from procuring employment comensurate with their
abilities. To be sure this is not a conventional approach,
where problems are analyzed from the viewpoint of effecting
increases in aggregate demand, decreases in working hours or
active labor market policies. But in light of the failure of
such approaches to achieve employment goals in the past, the
unconventional analysis would seem to be a more promising way
of dealing with the issues perceived to be currently facing
economic policy-makers in Panama.- 2 -
Given the rapidly growing labor force, a wait-and-see attitude
by the government - perhaps assumed because of hesitancy to
transgress political, economic or social tabus - would not
seem to offer a viable solution, since the employment problems
are not going to solve themselves. As a matter of fact such
an attitude would even seem to run counter to the Constitution
of 1972 (Chapter 3) where it is explicitly stated that the
State is obligated to establish the political and economic
policies necessary to promote full employment and ensure the
economic conditions prevail so that each employed person can
earn a decent existence. The modus operandi through which the
State originally perceived this to be achieved are primarily
embodied in the Labor Code (LC) of 1972. Therewithin the
relationship between capital and labor is governed, providing
"special attention of the workers by the State with state
interventions to make remunerated employment available to all
those without work" (LC, para. 1).
While most modern welfare (market-economy) states - and Panama
can be classified as such - have tended to assume a greater
role in achieving employment goals, it has become increasingly
doubtful that the above stated goals can be efficiently reach-
ed through state interventions in the labor market. Further-
more, when other policies (e.g. income distribution) are at-
tempted to be effected through the labor market, thereby di-
rectly influencing the price of and hence demand for labor,
the doubts (particularly in light of the increasing amount of
evidence from industrialized countries) about the effective-
ness of such a strategy become confirmed. It has been con-
vincingly shown for any number of countries that the good
intentions of the state usually get in the way of a more com-
plete clearing the labor market, thereby creating or worsening
rather than reducing employment problems.
Given the general validity of principles perceived as govern-
ing the workings of market economies - be they in industria-
lized or industrializing countries -, this project examines
See for instance Donges, Spinanger (1983); Spinanger (1983).- 3 -
the framework within which the labor market functions in Pana-
ma. It will specifically attempt to determine which barriers/
interventions keep the labor market from absorbing more of the
rapidly growing labor force, thus coming closer to achieving
the stipulated employment goals. It goes without saying that
while the removal of barriers from the labor market can pro-
vide adequate employment opportunities, accomodating policies
in other areas - which have been examined in other parts of
the Studies Program - are essential if other broader econ-
omic/social goals are to be achieved.
2. Scope and Structure of Study
Within the above framework this study attempts to deal with
employment problems in Panama by centering on a breakdown of
barriers/interventions in the labor market according to their
intended thrust. This breakdown is made along the following
lines:
I. Policies directly influencing pay levels
- legal minimum wages
- contract minimum wages and lump-sum pay increases
achieved via collective bargaining
II. Measures directed toward job rights
- employment security
- antidiscrimination
III. Actions aimed at job environment
- work rules
- job/occupational training
IV. Legislation embodying social aspects
- maternity leave
- paid sick leave
- unemployment compensation
V. Policies affecting the economic environment
- collective bargaining framework
- bureaucratic and legal ramifications- 4 -
This breakdown - as has been established in the meantime -
interfaces quite well with the problems encountered in the
Panamanian labor market and thus allows most relevant issues
to be covered. Experience from many developed and developing
countries unequivocally shows that the policies mentioned in
points (I) and (V) primarily effect the demand for labor ad-
versely; the other policies influence both the demand for and
supply of labor.
In applying this framework two alternatives were available.
First - and this would be the usual procedure - the appro-
priate macroeconomic indicators for each of these headings
would be gathered, tracked and analyzed over a certain time
period (or across sectors, regions, etc.) and then conclusions
drawn from the results. This alternative was not chosen, but
rather it was decided to approach the problem in a more chal-
lenging fashion, namely from the microlevel in order to at-
tempt to find out exactly what influence existing barriers/in-
terventions have or have had on specific employment and pay
practices; in other words a survey of firms was carried out.
Despite the risks involved in such an undertaking, it was felt
they were worth accepting knowing that a successful survey
could provide better insights into the interaction of emplo-
yers with the parameters (i.e. regulations) they face in the
labor market . The survey thus represents the main body of
Obviously such a survey is one-sided as the issues as seen
by the employees and employees' organizations are only indi-
rectly picked up. However, time constraints (and Murphy's
Law) made it impossible to cover the other side as well.
Nonetheless, the results of this survey quite adequately
cover the question posed. With the results of this survey
in mind it would seem to be a worthwhile additional project
to hook up to the employee's side of the story in order to
attempt to find out how large or how small the differences
or rather areas of agreement between the two parties are.
The result (i.e. the area of agreement) could then be inter-
preted as a map of an area within which - given the specific
conditions of companies/sectors - a social consensus could
be achieved. Since the consensus area common to all compa-
nies and employees would no doubt be relatively small, poli-
ticians could enlarge it in a manner to minimize resistance
and in accordance with economic efficiency criteria.— 5 —
this report. It does not stand alone, however, as the neces-
sary background information and data are presented to put the
analysis in the proper perspectives or extend the analysis
beyond the questions asked in the survey.
The study begins (in the remainder of this chapter) with an
overview of the salient features of the developments in the
Panamanian labor market. This overview also includes a brief
portrayal of other macroeconomic variables. In the next sec-
tion the institutional framework of the Panamanian labor mar-
ket is examined and the possible impact of various measures is
analyzed. This is primarily accomplished by drawing on the
results of the survey. The paper closes with a summary of the
results, policy recommendations drawn therefrom and conclu-
sions .
3. The Labor Market and the Economy of Panama; a Brief Over-
view
Employment problems in a small open economy like Panama, where
the exchange rate is given (i.e. the Balboa is on a one to one
relationship to the US dollar) and over half of the population
is concentrated in a strip of land (straddling the Canal)
about 50 miles wide and 30 miles long, where infrastructure
levels are relatively high thereby providing a basis for the
exploitation of locational advantages, with comparatively high
levels of education and an absence of political violence so
common to other countries in the region, would a priori seem
to be something of temporary or at the most of a frictional
nature. This is not the case, however, as neither do unem-
ployment levels show any sign of decreasing nor do job oppor-
tunities seem to be expanding in a manner to accommodate a
growing labor force.
A glance at key macroeconomic indicators (Table 1) highlights
developments leading to the present situation and reveals that
a different story could be told of earlier times. During the
60's Panama's economic performance far excelled that of other
Latin American countries in general. Not only did a low aver-- 6 -
age rate of inflation prevail, but real per capita income,
investment and exports increased in a manner otherwise associ-
ated with fast growing Pacific rim economies. Unemployment
rates remained at relatively low levels and labor force parti-
cipation rates increased over the years.
In the 70's, however, the Panamanian economy began to weaken
and growth rates of GDP per capita and most other key macro-
economic indicators dropped below average. While the growth of
merchandise exports even turned negative, private investment
just barely expanded. Developments in the labor market deter-
iorated as documented by the rise in unemployment levels as
well as by the sizeable decrease in the economically active
population (as % of total population - see Table Al).
While it's true that the 70's were particularly turbulent
years in which two "oil shocks" had to be suffered through it
would be short-sighted to place an overly large share of the
blame on such external developments. After all Table 1 does
put Panama's developments into perspective and relatively
speaking other countries did fare better. These developments
even occurred at a time when the dollar was continually de-
preciating thereby improving Panama's competitive edge over
countries not tied so closely to the U.S. currency. Further-
more, the various measures introduced in the early 70's to
promote offshore banking in Panama induced a strong surge in
the number of foreign banks and - because a full-fledged
presence is necessary - in construction activities.
Without going into further detail on the structure and growth
of the labor force (justice has been done to this in recent
World Bank mission reports as well as in the paper prepared by
Pedro Pou) three trends need be brought to attention:
- There has been a noticeable decrease in economic activity
rates - particularly for the younger age cohorts -, a devel-
opment which can be interpreted as reflecting the failure ofTable 1: Development Indicators for Panama and Selected Latin American Countries: 1960 - 1982
(The underlined values are above Latin American averages.)
Middle income Latin Panama Costa Rica Colombia Mexico Brazil Countries -America
1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- 1960- 1970-
1970 1982 1970 1981 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982
GDP/Capita 5.8 5.5 2.7 2.7
GDP by sectors:
Agriculture 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.2
Manufacturing 5.8 7.3 5.7 4.8
Services 5.5 5.5
Consumption
Private 5.2 5.2 5.4 4.3
Government 6.2 6.3 4.5 6.0
Investment - priv. 7.6 6.6 6.2 6.0
Exports 5.4 2.6 5.5 4.3
Imports 5.9 3.9 5.3 8.0
Inflation rate 3.0 12.8 20.3 43.7
4
Money Supply - - 25.0 45.3
Population
Total 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.3
Urban 4.4 4.2 4.2 3.5
Labor force 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.4
Potential labor - - 2.7 2.9
force
3
1Annual growth rates; where relevant in real terms. - While most of the series cover 1982,in some cases
only 1981 or 1980 data were available. It is assumed that such minor distortions do noticeably affect the
overall picture. - Population between 15 and 65 years. - For Panama deposit money; otherwise M-] .
























































































































































the labor market to absorb new entrants. While the reduction
could also include increased attendance in schools, the size
and speed of the change would seem to vouch more for with-
drawal from the labor force due to the failure to find a
job.
- The expansion of employment over the last 10 years has been
accounted for to a large degree (75%) by an increase in the
government sector. While an increase in the government's
share of the labor force is not an indication per se of an
inefficient allocation of resources, the magnitude by which
government employment expanded in Panama must be open to
questioning: Obviously to the extent that the state provides
or expands services which allow the economy to operate more
efficiently, such state activities could be sanctioned.
However, the expansion of government activities into a wide
range of sectors as well as a sizeable increase in given
ministries and institutions, has probably involved not only
a misallocation of resources but has also caused indebted-
ness and tax burdens to increase (see Nasser Saidi's paper).
- The sizeable decline in the number of entrepreneurs reflects
the general economic malaise in Panama in as much as it is
through entrepreneurs that new ideas are developed, market
niches are filled and flexibility is introduced into the
economy. The fact that they are on the decline means that an
important ingredient in the development process is lacking.
Entrepreneurs are also important in providing new jobs,
particularly of the labor intensive variety. Should they not
have been able to sustain business activities in the economy
because of the labor code, tax reasons or other regulations,
the chances are that a large number of them disappear into
the free-wheeling underground economy.
If these three trends and their interpretation can be taken as
correctly representing salient features of the Panamanian
economy, then there is every reason to believe that the pro-
blems in the Panamanian labor market do stem from rigidities
and distortions, the exact sources of which must now be deter-
mined.Chapter II - Interventions in the Labor Market in Panama -
Extent and Impact
1. Introduction
With the enactment of the 1972 Labor Code the government of
Panama set forth and considerably expanded its active role in
influencing the labor market begun in the Constitution of 1946
and Labor Code of 1947. The major changes incorporated into
the 1972 Code covered the area of job security (i.e. no free
termination of employment relations), hours of work, collec-
tive bargaining and in particular the formation of unions.
Generally speaking, however, the Labor Code of 1972 minutely
lays down and defines rights/obligations of employers/emplo-
yees. This is done in over 1000 provisions and procedural
rules beginning with general principles (see above) and fol-
lowed by books on individual labor relations (Book I), employ-
ment injuries (Book II) , industrial relations (Book III) and
(extensive) procedural rules (Book IV) .
Predating the LC by two years, and responsible for dealing
with most issues connected with the Code, is the Ministry of
Labor and Social Welfare. It is involved not only in labor
market analyses and planning, as well as in employment and
legal aid services, but also in aspects concerning collective
bargaining agreements, enforcement of labor laws and - perhaps
most important - judicial matters. In the last aspect the
Ministry was empowered (in 1975) to act as a legal court in
dealing with certain disagreements arising out of the LC and
not covered by other specific labor boards or courts (e.g.
sectional labor courts and Boards of Conciliation and Deci-
sion) .
Out of this system of Labor Code and labor courts two major
issues have developed. The first deals with the impact of the
Labor Code on employers and employees and concerns the degree
to which the Code has been correctly (or incorrectly) inter-
preted and applied. The second deals with the judicial pro-- 10 -
ceedings and includes the degree to which decisions have been
made in accordance with the letter and spirit of the law as
well as in a consistant manner. Whereas this study deals
primarily with aspects in connection with the first part, it
cannot be avoided that certain aspects of the second part are
touched upon as well.
2. On the Scope and Impact of Policies Directly Influencing
Pay Levels
Legal Minjn}um_Wages
Minimum wages in Panama have been anchored in the body of laws
governing the labor markets since the Constitution of 1946 and
the ensuing 1947 Labor Code. The form in which they currently
exist corresponds with the statement of general principles
(mentioned in Chapter 1) and provides a classic example of how
laws are formulated to achieve a certain goal which actually
cannot as such be acheived in such a manner. That is to say,
Section 172 of the LC stipulates that "every worker shall be
entitled to a minimum wage enabling him to meet the normal
material, moral and cultural necessities of his household;
this minimum wage shall be fixed periodically in order to
improve the workers living standard, taking into account the
particular conditions of each region and each industrial, com-
mercial or agricultural activity." In other words via a mere
setting of minimum wages (e.g. by the National Minimum Wage
Board) a minimum level of income is to be ensured. Beyond
this the increases in minimum wages (designated to be effected
every two years) are intended to improve upon the initial
minimum standard of living - obviously increases in excess of
the inflation rate must be effected.
Although only legal minimum rates are discussed here, the
same arguments apply to contract minimum wages; they are
therefore not specifically dealt with.- 11 -
Legal minimum wage rates in Panama have been increased three
times over the last 10 years (see Table 2) . After the last
increase (in 1983) they were - on the average - about 45%
above 1974 levels. Inflation, however, has negated any im-
provement in real terms, as real minimum wages actually fell
by over 13% in the same time period. Since average hourly
wages increased more rapidly than inflation, the relative
position of these receiving minimum wages also decreased.
While increases across the more populated areas of the country
were slightly below average, the rest of the Republic - i.e.
largely rural areas - had minimum wages increased at a rate
almost 50% higher. That is to say, in areas already suffering
from locational disadvantages and high levels of unemployment,
wages were rapidly increased, when instead measures should
have been taken to ensure a more extensive use of labor. It
can probably be assumed, however, that the compliance rate in
rural areas - particularly in small establishments - is quite
low. Hence the effective impact is probably not as large as
might be assumed. Only in those companies with unions, where
contract minimum wages have been set, would the degree of
compliance be high and thus the negative employment effects
larger. In any case the deterioration of the terms of trade
(as a result of the oil price increases) were apparently not
taken into due account when wages were set.
With the help of the survey (question ID) it was attempted to
find out how companies actually do react to minimum wage in-
creases (one of 10% and another of 50%). The reactions ana-
lyzed were in connection with those already employed by the
company (i.e. employment levels) as well as the number and
quality of those to be hired. In evaluating the answers it was
assumed that similar perceptions on forthcoming economic de-
velopments prevailed. In particular it was assumed that there
was a general consensus on how much of the increase could be
passed along in terms of higher prices.
The analysis revealed (Table 3) that an increase of 10% would
have no impact on employment levels in 75% of the firms ans-
wering. About the same percentage amount applies to hiring- 12 -
Table 2 : Development of Hourly Wages and Minimum Wage Rates (B./hr.): 1974-1983

























































































































































Average monthly salary in private sector divided by.hours/month X187). Deflated by
consumer price index 1974=100. (4) divided by (1). Estimated. Daily rate divided
by 8.5. In Panama City.
Source: Own calculations based on Boletin Informativo Salarios Minimos Vigentes, various
issues; Panama en Cifras (1984) p. 224; Situacion Social (1982), p. 134.
International Monetary Fund, various issues.- 13 -
Table 3 : On the Possible Impact of Minumum Wage Increases
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Source: Own calculations based on LCS.- 14 - BibHot&ek des Institute
tfo Weltwirtschaft Kid
policies (i.e. quantity of hires), but only half thought that
they would not increase their demands for more qualified la-
bor. Since a 10% increase in minimum wages is only about half
of what was experienced in the past, the firms were probably
able to adjust their estimates according to prior reactions.
It should be noted that - as could be expected - those pre-
dicting decreases in employment levels tended to be of smaller
than average size. Roughly speaking for those who gave esti-
mates, the elasticity of employment levels with respect to
minimum wages would be about 1.
In connection with a 50% increase in minimum wages we still
find that one third of the companies answering would not de-
crease employment levels - these are companies in which aver-
age wages/salaries are 5 times the hypothesized level of mini-
mum wages after the 50% increase (e.g. banks and certain, large
capital intensive manufacturing companies). However, an equal-
ly large number of companies (mainly of smaller, than average
size) find that such an increase would cause them to go broke
- a reaction which can be understood if it is known that mini-
mum wage rates would increase from about 40% of average pay in
the firms to 60%. Assuming this drastic reaction would actual-
ly occur and combined with the information on the percentage
decrease in employment and in hires in the other firms, it
would seem to be quite apparent that minimum wages are not the
means through which minimum income levels can generally be
achieved for all those working at the time of increase.
It goes without saying that in a market economy like Panama
measures aimed at increasing income levels - irrespective of
human capital levels or changes therein - via the price firms
have to pay for labor, will cause less labor to be employed
albeit at a higher wage for those who still have jobs. Often
the demand for labor is shifted to other labor force cohorts- 15 -
where average productivity levels tend to be above minimum
wage levels. To the extent that below-minimum wages are paid,
there is the tendency to do this outside the official economy
(given ineffective controls), thus causing those who are will-
ing to work for such wages to be forced into illegal employ-
ment relationships.
Despite knowledge about these negative employment effects of
setting wage floors dating back over 200 years (to Adam Smith)
and quite thorough research in the last 20 years , most socie-
ties have some sort of minimum wage regime, either in the form
of legislation - as in the case of Panama - or indirectly
through unions. Given this information it is difficult to
understand why countries would opt for minimum wages. Quite
likely it is the simple reason that the institutionalization
of such a measure is meant to exhibit that the government is
indeed doing something about minimum standards of living.
Furthermore the promulgation of minimum wage fixing agreements
by the International Labor Organisation (ILO) and the imple-
mentation of international conventions (nos. 26 - ratified by
Panama -, 99 and 131) covering minimum wage fixing obviously
elevates the status of such a measure to a level which is
interpreted as an official seal of approval. Whatever the case
- it would seem that the time has come to reconsider the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of minimum wages as a policy meas-
ure to achieve the above stated goals.
3. On Measures Directed toward Job Rights
Employment Security
Of the changes incorporated into the 1972 Labor Code the in-
troduction of job security after a given period of time (2
years) represented one of the sharpest breaks with the past.
See for instance the various articles in Rottenberg (1982),
in particular those dealing with industrializing countries.- 16 -
Whereas before the 1972 LC employers had the right (with but
few exceptions) to dismiss employees in accordance with the
needs of the firm, the new LC severly restricted the right of
the employer to dismiss workers. In the case of a dismissal
which was later determined by the courts to be unfair, it was
initially left up to the employee to state whether a rein-
statement or monetary indemnification was desired (Section
218). This was first revised in 1976 (Act- No. 95) by shifting
the decision on reinstatement or indemnification to the emplo-
yer and then again in 1982 (Act. No. 8) when it was stipulated
that a reinstatement decision would be made by a court and
that an employer could only opt out of the reinstatement (Sec-
tion 219) by paying a 50% increase in the amount of payment
due to an employee (in accordance with Section 225). Put into
hard numbers (see Table 4) this would mean that an employee
dismissed after 20 years would be entitled to receive 3 years
pay plus whatever wages had been foregone between dismissal
and execution of court decision. That such payments could put
firms into severe financial difficulties was fully recognized
in the report of a special task force appointed by the Presi-
dent in 1983.
The LC thus started off by offering job security as long as an
employee wanted it. As it stands now this right has been eli-
minated de jure and replaced by a de facto monetary barrier.
It must also be remembered that in accordance with Section 14
of the LC employees retain their rights regardless of changes
in the legal or economic structure or changes in ownership of
a company. Job security is thus something which is deeply
interwoven into the Labor Code, even if it explicitly does not
exist.
In formulating the survey an attempt was made to find out
whether the many complaints made about job security were ac-
tually reflected in the employers' evaluation of the five most
important provisions (ranked accordingly) negatively impacting
on a more efficient allocation of resources. In connection- 17 -






























































































































































Applies only to males (females) 40 (35) years and older. - Express-
ed as % of base pay. Risk premium assumes that during the first two
years of employment the risk to the employer of having to release a
person and pay the preaviso and severence pay is 3 %. Thereafter, it
is reduced to 1 %. Based on the estimate of 1980 labor costs in Dia-
gram 1.
Source: Own calculations based on LC provisions.- 18 -
with each provision mentioned it was requested that the firm
estimate how much could be saved by having the provision
changed. While such estimates should be viewed within caution,
they can no doubt be considered to be ballpark estimates of
what might be achieved by changing/removing certain LC pro-
visions.
As it turned out the most important single aspect mentioned
was associated with job security, namely firing/hiring con-
ditions/costs (see Table 5) . Well over one half of the com-
panies gave this issue a number one ranking - its share of
total mentions amounted to almost one third of all responses.
The prime importance of job security as a barrier to entry and
as a barrier negatively effecting pay levels can be clearly
seen in Table 6, which contains the dollar estimates of sav-
ings stemming from possible changes in the LC. Even if the
dollar amounts are exagerated and off by 20 or 30% the remain-
ing impact is still quite considerable . It might be added
that in a counterpart question on what changes the employers
felt would cause the most unrest among the employees (Table
A2) the ranking was similar to the one above. There also seem-
ed to be a certain degree of consensus among the firms answer-
ing that achieving more flexibility in the hiring/firing pro-
visions will have to be bought off from the employees. The
amounts listed in Table 6 can thus give some idea about the
monetary leeway available. This is also seen as being comple-
mented by other measures, which would give employees more
responsibility in influencing their own working conditions and
in shaping decisions within the firm.
Antidiscrimination Measures
Based on Article 62 of the Constitution, where it is stated
that equal pay - regardless of sex, age, race, nationality,
One reaction pattern which was not determined, was the de-
gree to which the savings would be used to hire more people,
expand production facilities or actively pursue rent seeking
activities.Table 5
- 19 -

























































































































Source: Own calculations based on LCS.- 20 -
Table 6 : Estimated Savings (B) Stemming from Changes in the
Labor Code





































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on LCS.- 21 -
etc. - shall be forthcoming from equal work, Section 10 of the
LC unequivocally guarantees the principle of equal pay for
equal work (i.e. for the same employer, holding position, job,
hours, efficiency and length of service constant). Infringe-
ments upon this principle can lead to court proceedings (Sec-
tion 145), whereby, however, it is up to the employee to prove
his/her case. Although the large differences which exist in
pay levels between males and females (see Table A3) could
possibly be interpreted as expressing some degree of pay in-
equities due to discrimination, no real attempt has been made
to envoke court action as is the case in Germany and the Unit-
ed States. No matter what might explain this lack of action,
it is probable in this case, that the potential problems are
mitigated by the low labor force participation rates and the
willingness of many females to be part of the secondary labor
force. For sure, the greater the tendency of females to become
part of the primary labor force and enter into occupations
with advancement potential, the more likely that conflicts
will develop.
4. Actions Aimed at the Job Environment
Work_rules
The work rules incorporated into the 1972 Constitution and the
LC cover a wide spectrum from the length of a working day to
measures protecting minors/women and paid leave of absence to
attend meetings abroad. As a matter of fact there is hardly an
area which is not affected by restictions or regulations of
some type. For instance each and every enterprise with at
least 10 employees must submit for approval detailed work
rules to the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, as well as
Pay includes ordinary and extra pay, bonuses, ex gratia
payments, commissions, tips, etc. made by an employer to an
employee.- 22 -
to the respective unions (otherwise the employees). Any
changes in work rules already approved require that the same
institutions consent to them. It is thus all the more per-
plexing to find only two specific mentions of provisions ne-
gatively impacting on the demand for labor. In the one case it
was the provisions (Sections 117-124) in the LC restricting
the employment possibilities for minors: Over 20% of the res-
ponses to the question about the basic reason keeping younger
people from getting a job felt that LC restrictions were a
barrier (see Table A4) . In the other case it was the same
question in connection with women - here only one single res-
ponse (out of 35) could be attributed to the LC.
One specific question in the survey did attempt to determine
the impact of the rule permitting extended leaves of absence.
This provision (Section 160) allows an employee to take part
in activities representing the country or a particular organi-
zation for a certain period of time (3 weeks within country
and 2 months outside the country) with full pay and irrespec-
tive of whether such a leave had already been granted to the
same person in recent times. Since firms have no explicit
right to deny permission it could be expected to find that
such an arrangement acts as an incentive for misuse and thus
proves to be quite costly. As it. turned out the number of
firms stating that Section 160 had been taken advantage of was
relatively small (11). They reported, however, that a total of
77 applications (representing less than 1% of employment) were
submitted in 1983 and on the average almost 2 months leave had
been applied for. In other words in most cases the maximum
limit of two months for foreign leaves proved to be more the
rule than the exception - and 2 months away in the company
means an average increase in base pay of 20% for the remaining
10 months. While larger companies could sustain such expenses
without difficulties, smaller firms would be financially hard
pressed if a key person left for such an extended period.
It might be added that generally speaking the questions in
this area - particularly as concerns environmental and health- 23 -
rules and regulations - were sparsely answered (see Appendix B
for discussion). Perhaps this failure to answer can be inter-
preted as indication that the measures had little negative
impact. More likely, however, ist the possibility that the
impact of other distortions (e.g. job security) was considered
to be so large that the measures analyzed here were relegated
to a secondary position.
Job/occupational training
The state-being obligated by the Constitution.(Articles 70 and
71) to implement education and training programs-reformed the
educational system in the early 70's to upgrade the level and
quality of those completing compulsory education. A nine year
general basic education program was established, whereby the
last three years placed stress on socio-economic (called
"Basic Cycle") aspects. With a large scale school construction
program in the mid-70's, 19 Basic Cycle schools (primarily in
rural areas) and 4 vocational institutes were built. Comple-
mented by specialized training programs in industries and
hooked up to job placement efforts the thrust of the educa-
tional policies would seem to be heading in the right direc-
tion. To help finance these educational expenditures - which
have accounted for about one third of govenment expenditures -
an educational payroll tax was introduced in 1971 - it placed
a 1.25% burden on employers and .75% on employees.
While this is not the place to go into more detail on the
efficiency of the educational system vis-a-vis the labor mar-
ket, the survey did attempt to roughly find out whether the
given educational and training system was producing skilled or
unskilled workers in line with the needs of the economy. This
was done by determining which general requirements the compa-
nies stress in selecting skilled employees and how pay differs
between various combinations of education, vocational training
and experience profiles; likewise characteristics of pros-
pective unskilled hires were also requested.- 24 -
Allow us to approach this issue from the micro-level, i.e.
from the position of a person making a human capital decision.
With four times as many unskilled as skilled workers being
hired by the responding companies (see Table 7) , the first
question to be raised would concern the decision to opt for
the path leading to a skilled or unskilled job. Given the
rapid growth in the labor force and assuming that the potenti-
al exists, opting for the path leading to a skilled job would
seem - in light of the almost 30% wage differential between
the two - to be the obvious choice. The next decision to be
made is whether to acquire the vocational training or try to
move into a job after receiving a general education. Given the
preferences of the firms, the additional training would be the
logical choice. This logical choice can also be interpreted as
a substantiation of the general educational and training poli-
cies followed by the government: if the firms had rejected the
system, they would have shown preference to train their own
employees. Furthermore, those who had received the education
and thus foregone income during this period would have at-
tempted to maintain an acceptance wage which didn't interface
with their actual value to firms. In this case the barriers
would not have been on the demand side, but rather stickiness
would have existed on the supply side.
5. Legislation Embodying Social Aspects
Maternity Leave
The protection of women during the pre- and postnatal period
is anchored in the Constitution of 1946 as well as in the 1972
Constitution. Its incorporation into the 1972 Labor Code is
unequivocal and straight forward - Section 105 to 166 of the
Since unemployment compensation as such does not exist in
Panama, it is not dealt with here. However, the earlier
discussion on job security covers certain aspects of inter-
est.Table 7: impact of Education as well as Vocational, Technical and
Clerical Training on Employment and Pay
Number of skilled/unskilled employed in 1983
Number of skilled/unskilled hired in 1983
3099/12371
397/ 1637
Characteristics preferred fora prospective skilled employee
A Good general education as basis for company training 15
B Good general education and training 37
No answer 2
Aver.
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How are employees fitted into skilled jobs?
We train them ourselves


















































































Source: Own calculations based on LCS.- 26 -
the Code contain the regulations setting up the broad cover-
age. The protection begins by making it unlawful to dismiss a
woman during pregnancy and five months thereafter from employ-
ment (i.e. without a valid reason and prior judicial appro-
val). It entitles the expectant mother to six weeks leave
prior the birttT and eight weeks thereafter, whereby the em-
ployer is liable to pay the difference between the maternity
allowance paid by social security and the amount otherwise
entitled to her. In cases where no social security claims
exist the obligation to pay is "incumbent entirely on the
employer". Once the woman has returned to work (eight weeks
after birth of the child) a 15 minute nursing break every 3
hours (or two half-hour breaks during the working day) and
short rest breaks are stipulated - both of which are consider-
ed to belong to the remunerated time worked. For firms employ-
ing over 20 females on the same premise a nursery is to be
provided, given the financial constraints of the firm. The
regulations also limit the employment of expectant women to
non-shift work and bar the employer from having expectant
women perform tasks which might adversely affect her condi-
tion.
This protection of women in the pre- and postnatal period
corresponds favorably with legislation applicable in Western
European countries (see Table A5) . Basically all these laws
date back to guidelines set up by the ILO in 1919 which were
meant to be applied to all women without exception. To the
extent that a society (or rather a government, on its behalf)
has decided that childbearing and the protection of mothers
must be given special attention - as is the case in Panama and
European countries -, then a key remaining question concerns
shouldering the financial aspects, without negatively influ-
encing the demand for (female) labor. In Panama a large share
of the maternity pay is taken over by social security pay-
ments, thus additional wage costs to be borne by employers are
either quite minimal or occur in but a few cases (e.g. if a
woman has not yet qualified for coverage under the social
security system). Of greater importance are thus the limita-- 27 -
tions imposed upon the employment of females during the pre-
and postnatal period.
Without intending to question the societal justification of
maternity protection, the labor code survey attempted to find
out whether and to what extent this regulation influenced the
employment chances of females . Although the female labor
force is less than half the size of the male labor force (see
for instance Table Al), it has increased more rapidly in the
past and it can be expected - in light of increasing education
levels and declining birth rates - to increase rapidly in the
future as well.
Particular care was taken in formulating the questions in this
part so as to try to prompt answers influenced more by econo-
mic factors than by emotional responses connected with mother-
hood and babies. The results of the survey are interesting
and revealing. Beginning with responses to questions on the
general protection of women in connection with performing
particular jobs and under certain working conditions, no major
impact could be discerned (see Table 8) - over 80% of the
firms stated that there would be no change with respect to
positions in firms, hiring policies or pay. This can be inter-
preted as corresponding with comments made vis-a"-vis work
rules (see above).
Maternity protection laws tell a different story. First of
all, about two thirds of the employers agree that maternity
protection laws negatively influence the number of women being
employed. This negative impact is reflected again in the table
(under biological characteristics) containing the basic rea-
sons keeping firms from hiring more women - 40% of the answers
fall in this catagory. Most interesting, however, are the
To some extent the impact of specific limitations on employ-
ment of women in certain types of economic activities (Sec-
tion 104) will also be picked up here.- 28 -
Table 8: impact of Loosening Regulations Protecting Women
Bnployment of women in firm: No change 44 More/better
No answer 2 Potions




Pay No change 45 Increase
No answer 2 Decrease
Do firms employ fewer women in childbearing age because of protection before
and after pregnancy?
Agree 35 Disagree 16 No answer 3
If agreement/ what changes should be made:
Peduction/elemination of post maternity job security
Reduce length/classification of maternity leave
.Costs should be borne more by social insurance




































































Source: Own calculations based on LCS.- 29 -
suggestions made for changing the LC and the ensuing impact
they could have on the pay of women - pay increases (here
estimated by the firms to amount to 25%) could be forthcoming
if more flexible arrangements for maternity protection could
be effected. Since the figure mentioned (i.e. 25%) is quite
close to the amount mentioned in connection with the impact of
job security arrangements, it could perhaps be interpreted as
representing a ballpark estimate of the leeway available for
arriving at an economically more efficient solution. Whatever
such a solution might entail, it would not only engender more
jobs for women, it would also reduce pay discrimination
against women, who do not intend to give birth to any more
children. That is, since average female characteristics are
assumed to apply to each woman in childbearing age, those who
deviate from the average are discriminated against by being
given less pay. With more flexibility (i.e. freedom of con-
tract) this could be avoided.
The 1972 Labor Code includes provisions dealing with paid sick
leave (Section 200) in connection with the discussion on sus-
pension of effects of contract. It is specified therewithin
that for each worker (beginning with the date of contract) a
sick-leave entitlement account is established, which accumu-
lates a sick leave entitlement at the rate of 12 hours' (144
hours') sick leave for every 26 days (year) actually worked.
Sick leave may be accumulated for not more than two consecu-
tive years and may be taken in its entirety in the course of
the third year. Should entitlement to social security benefits
not exist and a worker has used up his sick leave, extended
sick leave can be granted by deducting it from the annual
vacation leave.
In trying to determine how paid sick leave and the correspond-
ing social security benefits influence the employers' and
employees' actions, the labor code survey contained three
different questions. First of all, if paid sick leave was a
real problem it would be mentioned in the question concerning- 30 -
necessary changes in the LC. This proved not to be the case as
only a few mentions were made in the sick/maternity leave
group (see Table 5) . Secondly it was attempted to determine
whether the benefits induced a sickness pattern within a given
week which was heavily skewed towards the weekend, with but
few sick cases in the mid-week period. Of the 388 sick cases
reported (for Monday through Friday) over two thirds fell
fairly equally on Monday, Thursday and Friday. Although the
remaining one third (on Tuesday and Wednesday) is less than
the expected 40% share, the difference is not so large that it
could be definitely interpreted as being an indication of a
misuse of sick leave. It should be noted, however, that an
employee can be fired if on 2 Mondays in a month or on 6 Mon-
days in a year he is absent without permission or a valid
excuse. A Monday is interpreted in this context as any day
following any public holiday or day of mourning (Section 213,
11). Assuming this provision does influence the distribution
within a week, then Monday's sizeable share can only be ex-
plained by the fact that verified excuses by doctors are easy
to come by.
The third approach to the issue covered the breakdown of wage
costs beyond gross pay. That is, the firms were asked to in-
clude all payments made to employees beyond normal wages. Of
these payments sick leave accounted for about 4% and health
insurance costs (including to some extent social security) for
about 35%; when compared with total wages these two aspects
amounted to about 7%. After correcting for possible incorrect
computations by the firms and including the employees' share
to the total health/sick leave costs, a figure greater than
10% of gross pay would result. This is an amount which would
seem to exceed what competitive insurance rates might be for
such a set-up. In other words moral hazards and bureaucratic
inefficiencies noticeably increase the cost of labor to the
firm (and the employee) and hence reduce the' firm's labor de-
mand.- 31 -
6. Policies Affecting the Economic Environment
Collective Barg_ainin2_Framework
As in the case of employment security, the Labor Code of 1972
put collective bargaining on an entirely new path. Although
the right to organize was expressed in the 1946 Constitution,
the 1972 provisions not only explicitly supported unions in
their organizational efforts (e.g. Section 379 "The State of
Panama is under the obligation to encourage ... the establish-
ment and constitution of trade unions ... " and the protection
of members of unions in the process of establishment mentioned
elsewhere), members were also granted new rights and privile-
ges (e.g. special protection of union officials). Particularly
indicative of the philosophy behind the LC provisions dealing
with unions is Section 334 in which unions are "declared to be
in the interests of the general public, as an official means
of contributing to the economic and social support and devel-
opment of the country, the culture of the people and Panama-
nian democracy." Given this basic attitude it is quite logical
that if unions are in the interests of the general public,
then actions explicitly aimed at damaging unions cannot be
condoned. Such is the case and Section 388 lists practices
deemed to be unfair "against the trade union movement and the
workers' rights." Backing up the unfair labor practices is
punishment in the form of fines (100-2000 Balboas per infrin-
gement, to be doubled for each repeated offence) or - in the
case of unfair dismissal or treatment - reinstatement and full
reimbursement of back pay. Unions on the other hand may only
be find (10-200 Balboas) or disbanded (Section 390) . The im-
pact of this new legal framework is clearly reflected in the
surge of the number of new unions formed (over 50% of the
unions were founded after 1970), the rapid expansion in union
membership (an increase by about two thirds since the early
70's to over 80,000) and particularly in the exceptional in-
crease in the number of collective bargaining agreements (from
an average of only 12/year in the period 1969-71 to 151 in
1973) .- 32 -
It goes without saying that the newly granted freedom was
viewed with more than scepticism from the employers
1 position
and complaints about the LC being overly biased towards labor
abounded. It wasn't until 1976, however, that the government -
in light of a stagnating economic growth - effected major
changes in the 1972 code (Law 95). First of all collective
bargaining agreements were extended for two years (through the
end of 1978) without further negotiations. New enterprises
were granted a two year reprieve from complying with LC pro-
visions concerning collective bargaining. Even the right to
strike was restricted as the government could call for binding
arbitration and end strikes. Some but not all of these changes
were rescinded in 1981 (Law 8) . One of the specific changes
evoked in 1976 (and not changed in 1981) concerned the right
of unions to effect new negotiations even if just a minor
point like job classification difficulties (Section 401) was
affected. An employer who refused to agree to such demands
could be legally struck.
The LC not only sets up the rules of the game for carrying out
collective bargaining, it also explicitly stipulates that new
agreements reached cannot worsen conditions already existing
(Section 406) . By doing so, the Code inserts a high degree of
inflexibility into the system and includes but little possi-
bility of getting out of agreements made for instance during
better times. What seems to have been done to some extent by
employers in collective bargaining agreements in order to
attempt to compensate for this inflexibility, is to stress
incentives aimed at increasing productivity. For instance in
the case of sick leave about 65% of collective bargaining
agreements examined for the years 1982 and 1983 (roughly 150)
contained rewards if sick leave wasn't used. These rewards
were either related to salary levels or were offered on a
lump-sum basis.
Despite this attempt by employers, the unions have been able
to push through a whole spectrum of new benefits for their
members, which extend well beyond the conditions laid down in
the LC. For instance 28% (39%) of the contracts examined in- 33 -
1982 (1983) contained clauses which stipulated that after paid
sick leave has been used up at which time social security
payments would begin at 60% of the prior salary, the employers
would then pay some or all of the remaining 40%. Also sizeable
increases in the number of working days vacation (6-8 days
more than in LC) have been agreed upon. All in all these addi-
tional benefits have added noticeable amounts to total wage
costs already inflated by the LC.
The obvious question arising out of this discussion concerns
the degree to which employers see a necessity to revise col-
lective bargaining rules, so agreements based on current eco-
nomic parameters can be achieved. In referring back to Tables
5 and 6 it can be seen that changes in the LC with respect to
provisions dealing with various union aspects rank second
behind firing/hiring reasons. Although collective bargaining
rules rank only second among the three union categories, their
revision would effect by far the largest savings - amounting
to over 10% of average wages. Knowing that (1) taking into
consideration the individual financial constraints of the
firms and (2) productivity oriented collective bargaining
agreements were specifically cited, it would seem reasonable
to conclude that the LC has tended to decrease the competitive
position of firms and thus make jobs less rather than more
secure. A caveat is no doubt due, however, as it needs to be
explained why firms consent to such cost increases if they
realize that they then have to suffer from the consequences.
In other words, is this behavior LC-induced or are the em-
ployers incapable of achieving economically accommodating
bargaining agreements?
Bureaucratic and Legal Ramifications
This somewhat nebulous heading refers to the workings and
impact of the various parties involved in dealing with one
another in matters concerning the Labor Code. It covers all
areas where costs are involved in abiding by, policing and
administering the LC and where decisions are made in favor of- 34 -
one party or another. It is of course an area which includes
more legal ramifications than the other areas discussed so
for, but since it cannot be the purpose of this study to move
into such subject matter only the economic issues and impact
are examined here.
Given the LC as it is the, costs related to it evolve both in
firms as well as in the government sector. On the firm side of
the issue costs arise in connection with not being able to
carry out activities as desired (e.g. using personnel depart-
ments as opposed to more efficient employment agencies), as a
result of fulfilling LC requirements (e.g. setting up work
rules), responding to or effecting legal actions (e.g. ex-
penses for company/outside lawyers, personnel costs for legal
hearings/proceedings) and reacting to legal decisions (e.g.
costs of sentences imposed). The costs incurred by the govern-
ment are restricted primarily to the Labor Ministry and the
legal institutions established or used in connection with the
Labor. Code. While not all aspects can be investigated here,
some particularly interesting areas are treated.
As concerns the costs borne by the firm, the survey attempted
to probe into the matter by requesting information on possible
interest in private employment agencies, expenses involved in
dealing with LC cases and personnel department activities. It
was hoped to be able to collate this information in a manner
to allow the indirect costs of the LC to be estimated. Since
this was only, partially successful information from other
sources had to be gathered as well.
Beginning with a question on potential interest in private
employment agencies (see Table A6) , it was planned to compare
payment of such services with the costs stemming from similar
activities carried out within the personnel department of a
company. While obviously smaller companies would not have a
personnel department as such, costs could nonetheless be im-
puted for the time spent by a given individual. It was hypo-
thesized that the economies of scale which private agencies- 35 -
could achieve as well as the; quality of the services they
could offer, would mean that a significant savings could be
achieved. While the calculations must be considered to be just
reasonable guesstimates there would seem to be about a 3%-5%
savings (of yearly wages) per employee hired via a private
employment agency.
As concerns costs emanating from LC cases these were picked up
in the survey by requesting information on man-days invested
by personnel attending hearings/proceedings and expenses in-
curred by having to employ or retain lawyers to handle the
court cases. Based on the data provided, the lawyers
1 costs
(mainly from outside the company) and the imputed personnel
costs add up to about 1000 Balboas/case. Knowing that most of
these cases deal with employees being remunerated at below
average rates these costs could very well amount to 20% of the
annual wage/salary of the average employee.
The final component on the employers' cost side covers the
fines/payments imposed by the courts. The data from the survey
indicate that on the average about 3500 Balboas/case were
involved. Since the survey data was not considered to be suf-
ficient to allow correct interpretation to be made in this
crucial issue, additional information was gathered in the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare from 4 7 selected cases
(tried in 1982 and 1983) which had gone through extensive
legal proceedings. These data yielded an average cost per case
of almost 4500 Balboas (see Table 9). The information in this
file also allowed a further differentiation to be made
namely according to length of service and whether the case was
decided in employees' favor or by mutual agreement. As can be
seen the costs climb considerably as the length of service
with a company increases. For reasons which couldn't be clari-
fied, the average cost per case calculated from overall Labor
Ministry figures for the years 1982 and 1983 amounted to 618
and 357 Balboas respectively. Such figures would seem to be
too low, given the manner in which employers have protested- 36 -





































































Source: Own calculations based on unpublished data from Ministry
of Labor and Social Welfare- 37 -
and employees have gone to courts. It is thus assumed that an
average amount of 4000 Balboas/per case (roughly 70 % of
average wages) represents a reasonable estimate.
The costs in the government sector are primarily limited to
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare in the form of per-
sonnel costs. Although the rate of growth in the Labor Minis-
try's budget over the last 10 years was above average, its
share in the total expenditures of all departments is very
small (i.e. slightly over 1%) . For being such a relatively
small agency it has shouldered quite a large burden with wide-
ranging implications. After all any attempt to codify all
possible facets of labor market behavior (for an unknown time
frame) is not only going to induce problems in connection with
the failure to include or correctly specify certain aspects
(be it due to oversight or the passage of time). To some degree
this is testified to by the fact that by the end of 1984
roughly 25,000 cases - or an average of 50 cases a week - have
been dealt with (by the Ministry) since the reorganization of
judicial responsibilities in 1975. But - as has been seen -
the degree of regulation (i.e. inflexibility) also hinders
economic activities from being efficiently structured thereby
prompting avoidance and creating potential problems with em-
ployees and the government. Furthermore in the course of the
survey it was often mentioned that problems with the LC would
be noticeably fewer if the courts would arrive at their deci-
sion in a consistent and fair manner. That is, the interpreta-
tion of the Labor Code does not necessarily cause the major
problems, but it is rather the reinterpretation by the courts.
To conclude, it is obvious that the major costs of applying,
administering and policing the LC are borne by the employers -
the estimates of savings which could possibly be effected by
private employment agencies or major changes in the labor code
speak for themselves. For sure it is labor, in particularly
lower income levels, which is disadvantaged by being priced
out of the market.- 38 -
Chapter III - Summary, Policy Recommendations and Conclu-
sions
1. Introduction
The wide sweeping reform and reformulation of labor policies
incorporated into the 1972 Panamanian labor code was meant to
correct what was perceived to be an untenable distribution of
power in the hands of employers over employees. With the in-
tended shift in power towards the employees achieved, the
code, its interpretation and application have - despite some
few changes in the meantime - instigated rigidity and arbitra-
riness at a time when more flexibility and a greater degree of
certainty was called for. After all the labor force has been
expanding rapidly - and will continue to do so in the coming
years - and uncertainties in general - particularly from the
outside world - seem to be increasing. Given the fact that
policies instituted for other areas of the economy (e.g. in-
vestment incentives)' tended to discriminate against a more
extensive use of the factor labor, it is hardly surprising
that employment problems have been exacerbated.
Although many politicians and trade union leaders actually
seemed to believe that the major improvement in the terms and
conditions of employment would produce beneficial effects for
the economically active population, the policies they insti-
tuted and followed in fact did the opposite - they severely
handicapped the ability of the economy to open up new jobs for
the rapidly growing labor force. Albeit the well-meant meas-
ures gave employed workers more job security and higher pay,
but they prevented new generations of workers from finding
jobs and produced additional costs (passed on in the form of
taxes), thereby creating social insecurity rather than secur-
ity.- 39 -
2. An Estimate of Pecuniary Labor Costs Engendered
An examination of how the above described policies have in-
fluenced the price of labor, i.e. the amount that has to be
paid for employing an average person, reveals that by 1980 a
firm had to pay roughly 60% more for an average employee than
the employee himself was receiving on a gross basis (Diagram
1). This compares with roughly 30% in 1960 and about 35% be-
fore the introduction of the Labor Code. According to these
calculations the Labor Code can be generally said to have
added about an additional 20% (of gross pay) to the total
labor bill (assuming that wages were not otherwise influenc-
ed) .
But this type of calculation actually does not tell the whole
story, i.e. it is incomplete as it only includes the direct
costs of labor to firms and not the indirect costs ensuing
from other obligations contained elsewhere in the Labor Code
(Table 4, col. 5). First of all there are those provisions
covering the firing of employees and these embody potential
costs which must be taken into account by the firm. That is to
say, the decision to employ a given person is accompanied by a
potential risk that the new employee will not meet with expec-
tations and will thus have to be released at some point in
time. Since this is unknown to begin with an employer must in
essence establish a contingency fund which covers the estimat-
ed probability of having to pay for an employee being forced
to leave the company. Assuming that the risk in the first two
years of employment is greater than thereafter (and this seems
to be a logical assumption), then it can be determined that by
the end of two years another 12% (of gross pay) will have been
implicitly added to the wage bill. Once the two year period
has passed and employment security is achieved, the drop in
the risk causes total labor costs to initially drop not until
about eight years later do labor costs (because of the amount
that has to be paid for firing for economic reasons) reach
this level again. In other words, the fact that the risk of
having to fire a person is initially greater the employer is
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Diagram 1: Development of Total Labor Costs in Panama since
1960 - Compared with Germany since 1966
Source: Own calculations based on data from various national
sources.- 41 -
first two years - a further negative impact on the demand for
labor is unavoidable.
As concerns severence pay and long-service bonuses Table 4 (as
discussed earlier) quite clearly shows the amount which is due
in accordance with the new Labor Code (as opposed to the old
Labor Code). After twenty years of service two years of sever-
ence and long-service bonuses must be paid out, should an
employee be forced to leave - an amount which is increased by
50% should the dismissal be unfair. As socially justified this
ruling might seem to be, it places a large financial burden on
a firm - a burden which could well lead to economic difficul-
ties, should it have to be shouldered by a small company.
Two behavioral patterns might be induced by this potential
financial risk. One alternative could be for a company to
nurture relationships with employees so that their loyalty and
effectiveness will keep them with the company thus reducing
the number of dismissals. In this case job-seekers are put at
a disadvantage, at least to the extent that longer service
means fewer job openings. The other alternative for a company
could be to hire employees only on a short-term basis. While
this increases the possibility of finding a job, the jobs turn
out to be worth but little when it comes to climbing up the
occupational ladder. Hence in both cases we have a negative
impact on the demand for labor, be it in terms of quantity or
quality.
Given these estimated labor costs, the total of which lies
almost 90% above base pay, and the ensuing negative impact on
the demand for labor, it is difficult to imagine that the LC
was originally contemplated in this manner. What probably
happened is that the purported social goals of a given measure
were believed to describe the actual impact in the real world
(the term social policy illusions is applied in such cases) -
negative side affects are considered by definition to be out-
side the probable set. As in the case of Germany since the end
of the 60's, it wasn't realized that by placing the burden of
financing the various labor market measures primarily on the- 42 -
firm they were causing labor costs to increase beyond the rate
of growth of total factor productivity. Fortunately, once the
negative impact of prevailing regulations is understood, that
is, once it is realized that in market economies increasing
the relative price of one factor of production will lead to a
decrease in the demand for that factor, then the necessary
policy measures can be instituted.
3. Shaping Panama's Economic Future - some Institutional
Assistance
What seems to be missing in Panama to help avoid being af-
flicted by social policy illusions in the future is an insti-
tutional framework, within which the modalities and ramifi-
cations of possible policies are examined and discussed.
Under the assumption that a basic agreement exists between the
main factions of society concerning the necessity to achieve
higher employment levels, it is recommended that an official
institution be established, in which leading representatives
of major interest groups as well as members of the government
and selected economists are represented. The basic purpose
of such an institution - entitled perhaps The Commission on
Panama's Economic Future (CPEF) - would be to provide a clos-
ed-door forum, in which the major interest groups could openly
argue their cases and respond to misconceptions from the other
side, in the hopes of broadening the common base from which
policy reforms can be started.
It would be the role of the government in the CPEF to outline
the economic parameters, explain current economic policies and
sketch its most probable future economic course or merely
present the possible options it perceives. The role of the
selected (independent) economists would be to analyze the
economic situation and carefully portray the impact of alter-
native policies. It is expected that the ensuing discussion
As experience (and theory) shows the number of participants
in these meetings should be limited to as few as possible.- 43 -
between the opposing interest groups will then lead to a broa-
der consensus than if the traditional path of hearings or
government bilateral consultations with individual groups had
been followed. Obviously the CPEF is an institution to be
used in connection with the entire spectrum of economic poli-
cies, but since its potential usefulness in such a crucial and
controversial issue as labor market policies would seem to be
considerable, it is only appropriate to begin with such a
topic.
One of the first tasks of such an institution would be to face
up to an objective and frank picture of the implications stem-
ming from current labor market trends. It must be made un-
equivocally clear that carrying out economic policies in a
country like Panama, which is linked to the United States in a
currency union, is subjected to a constraint, i.e. that the
possibility to correct domestic imbalances (of short-run na-
ture) via exchange rate policies obviously does not exist.
While this situation could possibly be interpreted by some as
implying that Panama needs its own separate currency so it can
carry out exchange rate policies, this viewpoint is rejected.
As a matter of fact the lack of a central bank (or a similar
institution) and hence the possibility to issue a national
currency actually relieves the country of policy measures
which have been applied by most countries - whether more or
less developed - in a manner detrimental to domestic econo-
mies. It only needs to be recalled that the one area in which
Panama far excelled over other countries in the entire period
since 1960 was in the area of inflation. The fact that the
international economy determines prices in Panama or rather
that a central bank (or treasury) does not have the power to
let the presses run to produce the money needed, has no doubt
led to the relatively low inflation rates in Panama.- 44 -
4. Some New Approaches to Reducing Employment Problems
In the wake of the rebirth of the strong U.S. dollar it has
become evident - given the currency union set-up - that the
Panamanian economy needs to embody a greater degree of flexi-
bility - something which has been thwarted in the labor market
by the LC. It goes without saying that the rapid revaluation
of the dollar negatively impacts the demand for Panamanian
exports of goods and services. Unless domestic cost adjust-
ments allow price .reductions, output and employment will fall.
Initially the decrease in competitiveness may not have an
impact on sectors such as banking and insurance, which profit
from the presence of government regulations in other countries
- but even these sectors cannot continue to remain immune to
the impact of relative price increases. Furthermore, while
political stability is an important factor determining the
locations of financial services, the opening up of free bank-
ing and insurance zones in industrialized countries is bound
to mean more competition for Panama's services. But more
important - because of the number of persons involved - is the
impact of a dollar revaluation on agricultural activities as
well as tourist related industries. Particularly in the case
of the export-oriented agricultural companies, could high
relative costs lead to a long-term shift to foreign sources of
supply. At what point all this might occur is difficult to
say as the impact of changes in international relative prices
is all the less discernible, the greater non-price factors in-
fluence demand. Hence the reduction of distortions in the fi-
nancial service sector as well as the stable political situa-
tion in Panama may well compensate for much of the 50 % reva-
luation of the dollar. However, in the manufacturing industry
or other areas where international price changes can induce
E.g. the fact that unions cannot be formed in the financial
sector gives banks definite increased flexibility.- 45 -
quick demand reactions, the brunt of the currency union para-
meter is currently severely felt.
From the position of the entrepreneurs the currency union with
the United States implies the necessity to be flexible, not
only as concerns investment and marketing activities but also
vis-a-vis employment policies. Flexibility is also required to
allow the Panamanean economy to diversitfy and the meet the
challenges posed by the rapid introduction and dissemination
of new technologies. But it became increasingly evident
throughout the study that of those distortions keeping produc-
tive jobs from being created it was precisely the problem of
inflexibility (in the form of hiring and firing conditions)
which has caused the most damage. The fear on the part of the
firm that a potential employee would prove to be a bad risk
once job security has been achieved, seems to have grown to
the extent that fewer and fewer people were and are being
hired. Not only did this prove to be mentioned most often in
the question concerning suggested changes in the Labor Code,
but also the shift in the structure of seniority in the firms
(i.e. higher share of employees with longer affiliation with
the firm in 1983 as opposed to the early 70's) can be inter-
preted as reflecting the hesitancy to hire new employees. This
evidence thus backs up the findings or contentions made in
prior investigations.
If more flexibility is needed in the labor market but the
Labor Code induced greater inflexibility then one of the Com-
mission's first and foremost task's is clearly defined. Two
approaches to this issue would seem worthwhile discussing.
One embodies changing the respective sections of the Labor
Code on an economy-wide basis, the other aims at eliminating
distortions within specially delimited areas where economic
activities are freed from all major distortions.
Greater Labor Market_FlexibilitY via_EconomY~wide LC Changes
In pursuing the first approach the Commission would have to
examine the various provisions and discuss the pros and cons
of ammendments, changes or elimination. But this has already- 46 -
been done in the past, the most recent report being presented
in October, 1983, by a tripartite national commission (i.e.
with public, private and labor representatives). The conclu-
sions reached in said report, while mentioning the need to
change certain parts of the Code, tended to remain more glo-
bal, placing the blame for unemployment on the Labor Code but
also on a wide range of external and internal factors. Al-
though there is surely truth in such findings, they must also
be interpreted as basically reflecting the necessity of the
tripartite commission to reach agreement on a common denomi-
nator. The question must thus be raised as to whether the CPEF
would be able to "go beyond verbal generalizations and propose
the forceful changes needed. Generally speaking this could be
doubted. However, it should be recalled that entrepreneurs did
express an awareness of the fact that acquiring a greater
degree of flexibility implies that they must provide some
compensation to their employees. Recalling also that average
savings brought about by changing provisions of Labor Code
dealing with hiring and firing aspects accounted for about 30%
of wages, it becomes evident that there is room for conces-
sions. The types of compensation mentioned in this connection
usually embodied incentives aimed at ensuring that changes in
pay and performance were interrelated (e.g. profit sharing).
Likewise increased participation in decisions affecting the
economic environment of the workers was also suggested. Re-
alizing also (see Table A7) that employees in most cases would
receive higher levels of remuneration if incentives were al-
lowed to be applied with more flexibility (probably because
firms now hesitate to effect extra payments for fear of having
them declared to be wages) then it would also seem to be in
the employees' interest to allow flexibility in remuneration
modalities.
Assuming that these two positions can be construed as rep-
resenting common ground, then a change could be effected in
Article 140 of the LC, which contains the very broad-based and
all-encompassing definition of wages. Such a change would not- 47 -
invalidate present agreements, but rather it could be formu-
lated in such a way so as to open up the possibility of opting
individually or in contract negotiations for more flexible
wage agreements. Should such suggestions prove to be too
difficult to institute for those already employed, then a
partial solution could be achieved by applying the revision
only to those seeking employment. Since the basic principle
behind such a suggestion is to help ensure that remuneration
levels reflect productivity, it would therefore seem to be in
agreement with the equal pay provisions contained in the Con-
stitution and particularly those in Article 10 of the Labor
Code. •._...
Greater Flexibility _in_ Spe_c_ia_l _Areas__- the_ Free__Zone Concept
Expanded
It is quite conceivable these forceful (because they aim di-
rectly at the cost of labor) but efficient (because a better
allocation of resources is aimed at) changes - necessary to
help ensure that more new jobs are created - will meet with
considerable resistance throughout the economy. This is an
understandable reaction on the part of those who already have
jobs and feel threatened by the proposed changes. Despite the
fact that their reaction — on the average - can be interpreted
as probably running counter to their own long-term interests,
those who are inside the system will usually attempt to ward
off those who also want to partake of the benefits by finding
a job. Thus in addition to exempting job-seekers from various
LC provisions, it would - given the success of export process-
ing zones in Asia - seem worthwhile to provide an area in
which it can be demonstrated to those already employed that
they too could profit from a loosening of major LC restric-
tions as well. Such an area actually exists (at least to some
degree) in the form of the Colon Free Zone. It would thus
only be quite natural to expand this facility - or even con-
sider setting up a new one in Panama City - and ensure that
major restrictions and distortions are eliminated from such an
area.- 48 -
The purpose behind opting for an expanded and or new free zone
(otherwise called free economic activity zone) is to attempt
to profit from a greater and more efficient integration into
the international division of labor without subjecting the
entire economy to deregulation. Such zones represent a se-
cond-best solution and should be seen as but one step along
the path to freeing the entire economy from various types of
distortions. By doing so the factor intensity of economic
activities can be made to correspond more closely with the
factor endowment of Panama, thus allowing comparative advan-
tages to be exploited in a more efficient manner. In the case
of Panama this would seem to mean that more labor-intensive
(but also human-capital intensive) production methods would be
engendered. Developing in such a manner should help to over-
ride the capital-intensive bias the economy has been given
over the last decade. If Schumpeter's contention is true that
development evolves mainly from factors within society then a
zone will provide room for new or expanding entrepreneurs who
might otherwise have been stifled in the domestic economy by
restrictions and regulations. But perhaps even more important
is that such a zone in Panama - with the existing high level
of transportation infrastructure and locational advantages
vis-a-vis the North American market - could attract foreign
investors in order to provide new impulses for the economy.
While it is often argued that such zones provide but little in
the way of linkages for the host country, evidence from Asian
countries shows that this depends to a large extent on the
existence of a conducive economic environment . As a matter of
fact Taiwan has profited so much from the spin-offs of elec-
tronic companies in their zones, that they are able to produce
copies of top-of-the-line brand-name personal computers and
now even develop new electronic products in a recently estab-
lished high-tech zone. Knowing, for instance, that Taiwan has
been attempting to reduce its ever increasing trade balance
surplus with the United States, a special effort could be made
to attract investors from that country.
See Spinanger (1984) .- 49 -
Once legislation exempts zones from the Labor Code (and other
pieces of legislation hindering a more efficient allocation of
resources) it would be up to the individual employers and
potential employees to agree upon the conditions under which
work and pay are carried out. Assuming that employers operat-
ing in such a zone act in accordance with the consensus opi-
nion agreed upon in the CPEF, then the relatively undistorted
economic environment in the zone will induce additional em-
ployment under conditions, where pay incentives make extra
efforts worthwile.
What these proposed solutions also imply is that the govern-
ment should withdraw from its attempt to directly fix the
price of labor (minimum wages). A partial withdrawal - for
instance reducing or eliminating minimum wages for special
groups whose productivity is quite low - is not a solution
either, as it merely induces an improvement in the competitive
position of one group, thereby putting others at a disadvan-
tage. That is why increased wage flexibility (i.e. no minimum
wages) for all job seekers in general would seem to be an
efficient approach. Should society decide that minimum income
levels should be established, then this could be accomplished
via income transfers in the course of a tax reform. The
unions themselves should not only eliminate contract minimum
wages they should also allow wages to reflect interregional or
interfirm productivity differences so that wages can once
again correctly signal relative shortages or changes therein.
Aiming at §ocial_Goals but_not_via_the_Labor_Market
As concerns the social goals aimed at by a government the
first step must be to ensure that they are fomulated in such a
way so as to reduce moral hazard effects as far as possible.
As concerns health insurance, to the extent that inflexible
state controlled organizations are responsible for setting
rates, this could be deregulated so as to allow insurance- 50 -
policies to be structured according to personal preferences.
The well-known principle of coinsurance used by private in-
surers could serve as model. The insurance premiums could be
determined by incorporating a deductable initial amount to be
paid for by the employee and providing for premiums when in-
surance is not used. Such a system incorporates the same type
of incentive built into automobile insurance to induce safer
driving.
In the case of sick pay this would mean that individuals are
made more responsible for their own actions in deciding whe-
ther a minor health complaint justifies not going to work.
This could mean that the existing systems of paid sick-leave
would be reformed by introducing a waiting-period of one to
three days during which the sick employee does not get his
full salary from the employer; to compensate for this, the
employee should be allowed to purchase insurance which would
charge rates in accordance with the degree to which sick leave
has been taken advantage of. For his part the employer might
be interested in offering (monetary) incentives to all those
who do not take advantage of sick days. Such an arrangement
has been incorporated into the recent GM-UAW contract.
Avoiding the negative employment effects of maternity leave -
given the general desire of Panamanian society to support
population policies - is somewhat more difficult due to given
biological constraints. For sure, however, by shifting the
costs (e.g. of holding open jobs) of maternity leave away from
the firms to the individual (via insurance) and/or society
itself at least rids the factor market of one barrier causing
females to receive less competitive jobs. Assuming that cer-
tain biological limits must be observed so as to ensure that
neither the health of the fetus/baby nor of the mother is
endangered, then they should be set as guidelines. Should
they be extended to cover longer periods of time (as has been
done in European societies), the financial and employment
costs of such extensions must be made clear to all. In parti-
cular the holding open of a job for a longer period of time is
a measure which makes childbirth and childcare attractive, but- 51 -
causes (many) female jobs to become less competitive - as was
shown - and thus less secure. Should the full burden be
carried by society, then negative incentives could impact via
increased tax rates (increased tax avoidance).
Unemployment insurance is an area where wide-ranging changes
can be made. To begin with, in order to ensure that those
becoming unemployed or already looking for a job can find a
job the efficiency of the existing government-controlled em-
ployment services can be improved by allowing competition from
privately run organizations as well. It can be shown that a
sizeable share of the firms were interested in such agencies
and most of these would be willing to pay for such services
(see Table A6) . Obviously they expect the employees hired
through such agencies to be better qualified than those they
could find themselves. Hence a better allocation of resources
will result.
Given improved information parameters in the labor market, it
would then be possible to shift part of the financial burden
away from the price to be paid for labor. That is, the intro-
duction of unemployment insurance (administrated privately,
i.e. independent of the government) could be contemplated, as-
suming certain conditions are observed. First of all the con-
tribution to the insurance fund should be shared between em-
ployers and employees. Secondly, the size of the contribu-
tions could be determined by the extent to which a company
contributes to unemployment - the higher the turnover, the
higher the rate, provided that the unemployment is not induced
by excessive wage increases. This would act as an incentive
for the company as well as the employees to induce a conducive
work environment. Third it must be ensured that the policies
offer an unemployed person incentives to be successful in
finding a productive job as opposed to participating in rent
While leave in the postnatal period could be shared by both
parents usually the male earns considerably more than the
female, so that a longer period of leave for the male -
unless fully remunerated - would in most cases not be in the
probable set.- 52 -
seeking activities. Should a job comensurate with human capi-
tal levels not be found within a certain period of time, then
a lower level would have to be accepted. This, time period
could be changed in line with the general availability of
jobs. Finally, it is also important to make sure that the
unemployment benefits together with other transfer payments
are kept clearly below the disposable income earned while
employed. Such corrective measures would promote and increase
individual efforts to adjust to structural changes and to
search for employment opportunities. As it stands now
employment security as provided by the Labor Code, apart from
increasing labor costs, tends to acutally reduce labor
mobility and perpetuates the existence of inefficient economic
structures.
Generally speaking, in an effort to provide definite incen-
tives to behave in a manner interfacing with macroeconomic
goals, employers and employees could be made more responsible
for the impact of their own actions on employment levels. This
could be accomplished by requiring unions and employers' orga-
nizations to participate in the costs of financing unemploy-
ment compensation. To the extent that wage agreements are
reached which exceed the limits set in accordance with macro-
economic goals, by (employment-neutral) productivity increases
and by the development of the labor force, thereby causing
employment levels to drop, the responsible parties could be
made to contribute to the ensuing increased unemployment com-
pensation expenditures. If employment levels increase due to
low wage agreements the organizations would accordingly re-
ceive money. Since both employees and employers would be
interested in avoiding payments there is an enticement to not
only agree upon wages within given parameters but also to
increase productivity; in both cases the result will create
competitive jobs. Obviously, the concept of compulsory con-
tributions implies that the existing legislation on employment
security be relaxed.
While government regulations in the above issues were seen as
a hindrance to allowing the labor market to adjust with grea-- 53 -
ter flexibility to changing parameters, there might well be a
case for its involvement in policies affecting the job envi-
ronment (even if questions in this connection were hardly
answered). That is, in the case of environmental health ha-
zards, the health costs induced (i.e. to the extent that the
risks are not included in the premiums) would probably be
carried more by society than by the firm; thus a certain
amount of regulation could help keep the firm from attempting
to pass along its costs in the form of occupational illnesses.
This would also seem to be suggested in light of existing
studies (in the United States) indicating that individuals or
smaller organizations not only had difficulty in determining
what was necessary but also in determining whether those mea-
sures instituted were in accordance with legislation.
With job training it is similar (in the opposite direction,
however) to the extent that increased productivity stemming
from higher human capital levels is something from which so-
ciety can profit. Thus analogous to health hazards, firms
should only have to pay for training to the degree that only
they themselves can profit therefrom; the workers themselves
can be asked to contribute to the financing (in the form of
lower wages) as they will be compensated by higher incomes in
the future. General training, however, should not be treated
differently than any other policy aimed at increasing human
capital levels in the economy at large. This is often the
case where university education not only receives generous
direct subsidies, but also is given special tax treatment.
Keeping Wages and Wage Costs in Line with Productivity Levels
The gist of the impact of all these policy recommendations is
to weed out those distortions from the labor market which keep
labor costs above levels that would allow higher employment
creation to result. As a basic principal average wages must
not increase taster than average productivity, adjusted for
changes in the terms-of-trade and capital costs. One step that
can immediately be taken in this direction without having to- 54 -
effect new legislation would be to reach - via the CPEF - a
consensus between various parts of society to ensure that at
the least wage moderation prevails.
It becomes clear, however, that wage moderation needs time to
reach a significant impact on the level of overall employment.
Therefore, trade unions have to be prepared to exercise re-
straints on wage claims during various rounds of collective
bargaining, if they can be expected to represent the interest
of the whole labor force (and not only of the employed). Wage
moderation has to be complemented by a removal of the system
of contract minimum wages (which lie above legal minimum le-
vels) , in order to allow job seekers (particularly youngsters)
to find employment at lower wages, which still is better than
not to find a job at all. All this would not mean that wages
would remain constant or decrease at the economy-wide level.
On the contrary, wherever there are specific shortages of
labor supply (depending on skills, industries and locations)
wages would have to increase. A functioning labor market in
which specific supply and demand developments are balanced
would thus manifest itself in the wage drift. Existing dis-
tortions of the wage structure would thereby be reduced.
5. Conclusions
This paper has been written around the hypothesis that Panama
is suffering, to a large extent, from classical unemployment.
It has its roots in the labor market policies of the govern-
ment as manifested in the Labor Code. These policies have
increasingly come into conflict with the need - or rather
necessity - for flexibility in the labor market. It would be
quite correct to state that, many of the unemployed were just
priced out of the market.
If the problem of mass unemployment is to be solved, funda-
mental changes in attitudes and policies are required. These
changes require reaching a modus operandi in the CPEF and- 55 -
include removal of the many government-implemented rigidities
in the labor market as well as wage moderation, complemented
of course by similar policies in other markets beyond the
scope of this paper but dealt with in other reports of the
Economic Studies Program. There are already numerous examples
showing that workers are prepared to accept a reduction of
real wages in order to secure their jobs and open the door for
new jobs to be created. While it was basically a distrust in
the market which led to the institution of the Labor Code, the
market - if it is allowed to function smoothly - can indeed
adjust smoothly even to rapid changes in demand for and supply
of labor.
Just remember that the USA after World War II accomplished the
task of releasing and integrating almost 20 million soldiers
into the production process, without major difficulties in but
a few years. Just as impressive was the rapid absorption of
15 million refugees into economic life in West Germany up
through the end of the fifties and a further 4 million guest-
workers up through the 60's - that is up to a point in time
where labor market interventions in Germany were hardly pre-
sent. Since then the German government has intervened in fac-
tor markets on a broad front and now the once famous "economic
miracle" is faced with high unemployment levels which would
have been considered to be impossible at the end of the 60's.
Thus in Germany - as in Panama - the solution to the employ-
ment problems is seen in the removal of distortions keeping
the demand for labor from expanding and keeping new entrepre-
neurs from turning their ideas into competitive ventures.- 56
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Source: Own calculations based on Censo Nacional (1980), p. 18; Proyecciones de la Poblacion de la
Republica de Panama, por sexo y grupo de edad (1978) , Hipoteses III.- 58 -
Table A2: If the Above Labor Code Provisions Were Changed, Which


























































































































Source: Own calculations based on LCS.- 59 -
Table A3 - Relative Monthly Salaries between Male and Female
Employees 15 Years and Older by Age and Education




















































Source: Based on unpublished data from 1970 Census of Population,- 60 -
























































































































1Affecting working women; in Sweden working persons with more than 4 500 SK. income per year,
"m = month; w = week; d = days.
For those working at least 200 hrs./yr.
Payment for extended leave ^750 DM/month.
Source: Spinanger (1984), p. 27.- 62 -
Table A6: On the Use of Private Employment Agencies
Interested in using such
agencies?
If yes, willing to pay
for their services?

















Source: Own calculations based on LCS.- 63 -
Table A7 : On the Use of Monetary Incentives
Degree of use:
Problems with LC?
Would LC change mean
greater incentive use?












































Source: Own calculations based on LCS.- 64 -
Appendix B
Background Information on the Panamanian Labor Code Survey
The Labor Code Survey (hereafter referred to as LCS) was in-
itially conceived to cover about 250 firms in all major sec-
tors of the economy - aside from the unimportant mining sector
only the public sector (inclusive of the Canal Zone) was not
intended to be included. The sample for the LCS was according-
ly structured so as to broadly reflect the economic structure
of the economy (see Table Bl for an overview and comparison
between survey and total economy) - given the above deletions
- with three exceptions:
the financial sector, because of the assumed comparative
advantages which have evolved, was overstressed;
the manufacturing sector, which is relatively small, but
because of its potential was overstressed;
firms located in the Colon Free Zone - which was consi-
dered to be a relatively undistorted environment - were
overrepresented so as to be able to attempt to use them
as a control group.
However, not only was the sectoral structure of the economy
taken into consideration in setting up the sample for the LCS,
also the geographical location (i.e. firms located outside
Panama City and Colon were selected), the size of the firm as
well as the nationality of the owners were given attention in
structuring the LCS.
Given these criteria the names of the companies were then - in
most cases - selected from lists used by government ministries
for preparing sectoral surveys/censuses. In the case of banks
a raw listing of all banks was used. Information on companies
with foreign participation was culled to some extent from




































































































































Total 281 100.0 54 100.0 19.2 17.22 100.0 528.9 100.0 1745.8 100.0
Individual positions do not add to total because of missing sectors. - Economically active population 10 years
and older. - 31980 gross domestic product in constant (1970). prices. - ^Excludes mining. - ^Estimated.
Source: Census of Population (1980), Panama en Cifras (1984), p. 147.- 66 -
merce in Panama. Once the name of the responsible party at
each of the companies was established the survey was sent out
by mail to all the selected companies. For reasons unknown to
us the mail system - as revealed in the ensuing telephone
check of receipt of the survey - proved to be a black hole
into which about 100 surveys disappeared, thus necessitating
the hand-carrying of a 100 additional surveys to these compa-
nies. To the extent that the telephone check of receipt of the
survey resulted in a downright refusal to fill out the survey,
additional companies were added to the list. The final tally
of 281 (as shown in the table) thus reflects the initial set-
up plus the replacements. Every attempt was made to ensure
that the companies added to the list corresponded to those
removed.
As can also be seen from Table Bl the structure of the final
sample - which contains only about 20% of the original firms -
differs from the initial set-up; i.e. the response rate of the
firms differed across sectors and across the other selection
criteria. Given the reduced size of the final sample no at-
tempt was made to realign it according to the initial con-
straints. Furthermore, the sample will obviously not allow the
planned degree of differentiation between the various economic
criteria. However, it is assumed that the total number of
observations still allows sufficiently significant generaliza-
tion on the impact of the labor code to be made.
As concerns the structure of the survey, it was comprised of
two major sections, first (I) a subjective and then (II) a
factual part. The two sections were designed to be answered by
different persons - one with moire of an overview of company
policies (i.e. at the management level) and the other with
comparative advantages in dealing with company data (i.e. in
accounting or personnel dept.). This division of labor was not
only supposed to ensure that the most capable persons would be
involved in filling out the questionnaire, but just as import-
ant it was thought that the splitting up of the work would
perhaps help ensure that surveys were filled out as completely- 67 -
as possible. As it turned out one person usually usurped the
survey and the surveys that were returned often were not
filled out to the degree hoped for.
The first part contained questions on the major areas covered
by the labor code or on economic environment issues relevant
to the labor market. The answers given to these questions - to
a large degree subjective - provide the core of the analysis
of the labor code. The areas covered in this part were as
follows:
IA: issues surrounding the payment of monetary incentives
and problems evolving therefrom;
IB: questions about the impact of health and/or safety
regulations on employment and production activities,
particularly with regard to costs involved;
IC: information concerning hiring methods and potential
interest in as well as willingness to pay for private
employment agencies;
ID: estimates on impact of changes in minimum wages on
employment in the firm, as well as on quantity/quality
of new hires;
IE: queries about barriers keeping young people from being
employed;
IF: questions on the impact of training, education and
experience vis-a-vis hiring, employment and remuner-
ation practices/preferences/differentials;
IG: inquiries about the impact of laws protecting women at
work and during pregnancy as well as other barriers
keeping more women from being employed;- 68 -
IH: opinions on necessary changes in labor code and esti-
mates of what they would mean in terms of financial
benefits to the company and the opinion of employer on
probable employees' reactions to proposals and sugges-
tions as to how employees' consent can be achieved;
II: perception of major economic factors limiting exports
and imports (pertained to manufacturing companies on-
ly) .
The factual questions posed in the second part were centered
around the economic situation of the company and its inter-
actions with employees, unions and the labor code. This in-
formation was intended to provide the framework within which
the answers to the first part were to be interpreted. Data was
collected wherever possible for 1983, 1980 and 1970. The fol-
lowing broad categories were covered:
IIA: background data on firm - i.e. on age, nationality of
ownership and sector;
IIB: information on sales, salaries, expenses, number of
employees, years of service and skill structure of em-
ployment;
IIC: questions on time worked, days of vacation/holidays
and sick days;
IID: questions on unions represented, membership therein,
strikes, impact of unions on pay/benefit levels, em-
ployees protected/on leave/given paid absence because
of union membership;
HE: information on extent and amount of fringe benefits as
well as on problems connected with overtime payments;- 69 -
IIF: listing of labor code cases, amounts paid for cases
lost; types of cases confronted with (i.e. labor code
number), lawyers fees and time spent by company of-
ficials on cases;
IIH: data on size, cost and activities of personnel depart-
ment in finding qualified employees as well as number
of employees joining/leaving company;
III: questions for manufacturing companies only on produc-
tion processes, exports and inputs.
After initially drawing up and formulating the LCS it was put
through a brief testing period in Panama , tapping thereby the
knowledge of those directly involved with the code. Both in
the case of the firms as well as with the other persons con-
sulted the survey was deemed to touch on most of the essential
labor market issues. Aside from small changes made in the
presentation of the survey for tactical reasons, these dis-
cussions resulted in the initial version of the survey being
complemented in three points. First of all the inclusion of a
question on monetary incentives was felt to be essential,
since some of the difficulties with the code are seen to stem
from attempts to have incentives be made permanent parts of
the salary. Secondly the question concerning overtime payments
was prompted, since the code seems to be open to misinterpre-
tation with regard to commencing and terminating overtime pay.
Third, a question on the granting of protection for union
members and granting leave for union activities/activities in
accordance with Article 160 was - because of the potential
implicit/explicit costs - also included.
While it is true that a more thorough prechecking of the
survey could have tightened it up and shortened it by con-
centrating on but a very few issues, time and personnel
constraints kept this path from, being taken. The cost of
not doing so must be seen to some extent in the low re-
sponse rate. On the other hand the in-depth information
provided by about half of the companies answering the sur-
vey must also be taken into consideration.- 70 -
While it was realized that some questions would/could probably
not be answered by smaller companies and requests for data
from 1970 would also not draw a large response rate, the im-
portance of trying to find out about certain attitudes/econ-
omic behavior patterns and the importance of trying to de-
lineate between a before and after situation seemingly dic-
tated their inclusion. In only one case did a question not
prove to induce a required level of responses; i.e. in the
area .of health and/or safety regulations. However, this result
as such probably does reveal the actual impact of said regula-
tions , namely that it does not basically negatively affect
companies, neither with respect to employment nor as concerns
production costs.
The biggest problem encountered in carrying out the survey was
not embodied in answering the questions nor in interpreting
them, but rather in the behavior of the companies themselves.
This manifested itself in various ways, but two response pat-
terns are discernable:
No response
- Companies basically refused to answer ' the survey right
from the start. Most of the time no reason was given for
this reaction and since it was usually communicated via a
secretary there was no possibility of attempting to over-
turn the decision ;
Since this question was second on the list it is unlikely that it was
not answered because the person filling out the survey was too fed up
with answering the questions.
2
Usually no reason was given, but in those cases where one was offered
it was either (1) lack of time; (2) lack of faith in the confiden-
tiality. As noted earlier every initial refusal to answer the survey
resulted in an additional questionnaire being sent out - thus no
"damage" was done.- 71 -
- after initially agreeing to answer the survey, they then
failed to respond to further phone calls (e.g. to arrange
an appointment to explain the survey in order to ensure
correct interpretations) and finally - after numerous,
increasingly more insistant phone calls - merely stated
that they had changed their mind;
- companies merely lost surveys (sometimes more than once).
Inaccurate/incomplete response
- the questionnaire was not given to a person whose posi-
tion allowed him to have access to the necessary informa-
tion to correctly answer the question;
- the correct persons answered the surveys but they refused
to arrange for a meeting in order to discuss the ques-
tions.
Based on this evidence and given the openly expressed desire
of the business community in Panama to have changes effected
in the labor code, their behavior at first would seem to be
inconsistent or at best incomprehensible. This is probably not
the case. More than likely the reaction of the firms is just
logical behavior based on years of experience with other sur-
veys, all of which aimed at inducing important changes in
economic policies and most - if not all - of which accom-
plished but little. Rational expectations thus prevailed since
no benefit was perceived to be forthcoming to compensate even
for the small marginal costs invested in answering the survey.
Furthermore, the survey was carried out at a time when elec-
tions were up-coming, the outcome of which was unknown. Thus
the question was no doubt posed as to why a survey should be
answered which might well not produce even a small ripple once
the election was over. And after the election was over the
slim margin by which it was won probably did not help convince
many to respond to the repeated requests to answer the survey- 72 -
or to answer the survey in its entirety. Contributing to this
last attitude was also the fear that some of the information
might be released to competitors or unions - hence the subjec-
tive part was often quite fully answered, but not the objec-
tive section .
As concerns the first part, the response information is con-
tained in the various tables in the study. In Table B2 a com-
plete overview of the number of firms (out of 54) not respond-
ing to each question in the factual part (Part II) of survey
is given. (The reader is referred to the actual survey for the
exact wording of each question, designated here by only a
brief wording.) The tables covering the important first part
reveal that the essential questions - despite the above diffi-
culties - were answered to a large enough degree to allow them
to be analyzed. In the case of the second part, at least
enough general information was given for 1983 and to some
extent for ]980 to provide a rough framework within which the
answers to part one can be further evaluated.
It might be added that some companies had difficulty com-
prehending why such information was being requested, since
they know after all that most of it existed in some minis-
tries already.- 73 -
Table B2
Response Rate for 54 Firms
vis-a-vis Questions on Firm Data













































Average hours per workday
Average length of workweek
Holidays per year




In last 2 full weeks how









































































































Which unions in company
Union A
Union B
No. of employees in union
Union A
Union B
















































































































Court cases based on LC
Total submitted
Won by employer
Costs of cases lost
Back pay
Severence pay
No. of cases receiving
severence pay
Amount paid - Total
After 1 year's service
After 5 year's service
After 10 year's service















No. of persons engaged in
hiring/search matters
Total No. of persons in
personnel dept.
Wages and salaries paid to
all personnel dept."
































































Your company has been selected to be questioned with respect
to the impact of labor market regulations on your business. That
is, in order to be able to thoroughly and adequately analyze the
degree to which labor market regulations in the Republic of Pana-
ma have induced problems for both employees (including those
wanting to be employed) and employers (including those who want
to start businesses) a survey of selected companies from all
sectors of the economy is being carried out.
These problems for employees and employers are seen as pro-
bably stemming from various measures which keep job seekers from
finding jobs (or at least adequate jobs), since regulations -
although meant to be socially beneficial - can actually reduce
the employers
1 demand for workers. The problems manifest them-
selves in the working age population bearing the burden in the
form of higher unemployment or underemployment, and the employers
being kept from efficiently structuring their activities. Assum-
ing this to be the case it can easily be seen that all can profit
from a better functioning of the labor market. How to best do
this is the goal of this survey. The essential results of the
study will then be presented to the Government of the Republic of
Panama as policy recommendations.
The sample is structured to be representative of the entire
economy. Since it is a small sample the cooperation of each and
every company selected is essential, should the results be able
to be analyzed and then used to suggest areas where improvements
can be made for the benefit of all concerned. It is hoped that
every effort will be made to help us in this endeavor.
In accordance with internationally accepted scientific stan-
dards all answers to questions on this survey will be treated
confidentially. Although the name of the company and address are
initially required in order to ensure completion of forms, they
will be deleted when the data are fully completed.
• ••/•••- 78 -
One final point: if you have difficulties with any
questions, do not hesitate to call us or otherwise let us know.
You can contact us anytime at the following telephone number in
Panama City: 69-4878. Likewise our postal address is apartado
6-6975, El Dorado. If you have the urge to provide us with data
or standpoints beyond what we have requested, please feel free to
do so. Although this survey was carefully prechecked, this does
not mean it is perfect. As a matter of fact only through a
fruitful interchange with each and every company will the survey
be able to achieve the standards set for itself.
We sincerely hope we can reckon with your cooperation in
filling out this questionnaire by the 28th. of March. We will let
you know shortly whether we will pick up your survey or if it
should be sent to a designated P.O. Box. May we thank you in
advance for your perserverance and cooperation.
Respectfully yours,
Isabel Atencio Andrea Butelmann




IMPACT OF LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS
PANAMA CITY MARCH, 1984
Carried out by the INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMICS (Kiel, West Ger-
many) in cooperation with SERVICIOS TECNICOS DEL CARIBE (San
Juan, Puerto Rico)
Important: This questionnaire has been kept as short as possible
to hopefully make sure that your company will be able to find the
necessary time to diligently fill it out. Unfortunately a shorter
survey would have meant the loss of information essential to
fulfill the goals we have set. Thus to simplify your task of
working through the following pages, the questionnaire has been
divided into two sections - this should allow you to split up the
work according to responsibilities in your company.
First and foremost in the initial section we need your well
thought-out viewpoint on questions concerning the interaction
between your company and the labor market. These answers will
provide the core of the statistical analysis.
Second and hardly less important is the second section, which
provides us with a data constellation to allow your answers in
the first part to be put into proper perspective.
Finally some questions may not interface with the organization in
your company. If so please either note this or revise the ques-




IMPACT OF LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS
PART I
Your Viewpoints and Specific
Opinions on the Labor Market
Interacting with Your Company
Name of Company:
Address:
Person filling out this part:
Position
Telephone N°.
Please direct all inquiries to Isabel Atencio/Andrea Butelmann
Tel:- 81 -
PART I
IA Giving your employees monetary incentives can help improve
productivity and create a better atmosphere in the company.
As you well know, however, doing so is complicated by the
Labor Code to the extent that the incentives can lose their
incentive character once they are paid. That is, employees
have the right to ensure that such payments become a permanent
part of their remuneration.
(1) Does your company use such monetary incentives?
Quite extensively [_J In some cases No
(2) If you have had Labor Court cases with this issue, how much
was involved on the average in each case? ,$
(3) If this part of the Labor Code were to be changed to allow
these incentives to remain incentives, would your company
increase use of them?
Yes No
(4) Assuming the Labor Code were to be changed accordingly,
would the starting pay for jobs (where incentives would
be introduced) be changed?
Yes
Yes
, it would be increased by
, it would be decreased by
No change
(5) Do you feel that most employees in your company would be
in favor of such benefits, i.e. in favor of receiving
remuneration more in line with their individual
productivity levels?
Yes No •
Other (please specify)- 82 -
IB (1) What particular health and/or safety regulations
do you feel most negatively influence operations in
your company and why?
(2) If these specific regulations were accordingly changed
or eliminated what costs of operations (annual basis) and
capital costs would have been avoided?
(3) What would such changes in the above regulations (i.e
without any other changes in the Labor Code) cause
your company to do today vis-a-vis the following






Increase Decrease No change
IC If private employment agencies were permitted, they could
assume the important responsibility of screening employees
for the appropriate jobs - a service now provided by your
personnel department.
(1) Would you be interested in such services?
Yes No we. prefer to do it ourselves,
(2) If yes, would you be willing to pay for such services?
Yes No I the employee should pay.
(3) How much would you be willing to pay (% of expected
annual wages/salary)? %- 83 -
£D If legal minimum wages were increased today by 10% or 50%,
how would this affect (1) those already employed by the
company (i.e. would anyone - how many? - be released?) and
(2) hiring policies (i.e. fewer people - how many? - hired?;
more productive people hired?; more time spent looking for









10% increase 50% increase
JE The problem of youth unemployment is quite serious, as it has
often been shown that longer periods of unemployment severely
affect employment chances later on. Hence providing training
and appropriate jobs for youth is quite crucial.
If it weren't for what basic reasons (list up to five in order







IF Vocational, technical and clerical training provide a basis
— from which higher productivity can result.
(1) For prospective skilled employees of your company (i.e.
excluding managerial, supervisory, professionals and un-
skilled jobs) what characteristics (given a person with
otherwise the same capabilities) would you prefer?
A A good general educational background (e.g. some second-
ary school education) which can be used as basis for
company training programs. ' '
B A good general educational background followed by
completion of a vocational, technical or clerical train-
ing school. Q^J
(2) How much roughly would the initial pay difference (in %)
be for an average job between a person hired according to
A and one hired according to B?
Pay difference
(3) If A also had prior experience how would this affect the
pay difference (in %)? I
(4) How many employees were hired in 1983 for skilled jobs?
(5) How do you presently find employees to fit into skilled
jobs? (Use 1983 as reference year. More than one box
can be checked off.)
. .% of. cases
We train them ourselves I 1
We hire trained employees
with no experience
We hire trained, experienced
employees .
Other (specify)
(6) In hiring unskilled workers what are the three most import-




(7) How much more (in %) does a newly employed average skilled
worker receive over an unskilled v/orker?
Pay difference- 85 -
IG Women are granted protection by law which keeps them from
working under certain conditions and in certain occupations.
If these restrictions did not exist how would the employment,
hiring and pay policies of your company change?
(1)Employment: No change









(4)Women are also granted special protection during and after
pregnancy. It has been argued that such protection causes
firms to employ fewer females in childbearing age.
Do you feel that employers agree
or disagree
with this statement?
(5)If you feel agreement exists in question (4), what changes
could be made in the legislation and what affect would
such changes have with respect to the number of females
employed (% change or absolute number - state which one)?
(6)If it weren't for what basic reasons (list up to five in







IH (1) If your cbmpany were to suggest specific changes in the
— Labor Code, which five changes would it have made (in order
of importance) and how would these affect costs of






(2) Which of these changes do you see as likely causing
the most resistance or unrest among the employees
(refer to rank indicated in previous question) and what








Action to win employees support
II An extra question for manufacturing companies
Many complaints have been made not only about the negative
impact of labor market regulations, but also about import
restrictions and domestic regulations in other areas. If
you export, what three factors do you feel would be a
problem if you wanted to expand capacity to increase exports?
In doing the same to supply the domestic market what three













Person filling out this part:
Position:
Telephone:
Please direct all inquiries to Isabel Atencio/Andrea Butelmann
Tel.:- 88 -
HA (1) In what year was firm founded in Panama?
(2) Nationality of firm__
% foreign owned .











(4) If manufacturing, what are major products produced (e.g,
electrical machines, non-electrical machines, transpor-
tation equipment etc.)
IIB (1) Annual sales and expenses (including wages and salaries)
Sales
Expenses
1983 1980 1970- 89 -







(3) How many of the employees have been with the company




Length of service (years)
<2 2-5 5-10 >10













1983 1980 1970- 90 -
IIC
IID
(1) Average length of workday for a fulltime employee
(2) Average length of workweek
(3) Number of days of vacation per year:
Average
After 1/5/10 years with company
(4) Number of holidays per year






(6) In the last 2 full weeks (i.e. from March 14 - March
27) how many employees were sick on the following days?
Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Sun.








1983 1980 1970- 91 -





(4) How have unions influenced pay levels and the amount of
fringe benefits in your company? (That is % difference
between what is now paid and what would have been paid
without unions.)
Impact on average pay levels
Impact on lowest pay levels
What was lowest pay level in
1983
Impact on fringe benefits
(please specify, e.g. 3 days
less vacation)
(5) How many employees in your company
(1) are granted protection because of their union status
within the company?
(2) received certified leave to perform union functions
. .. outside the company and for how long/often?
(3) received certified leave in accordance with Article
#160 and for how long/often?
(1) number granted protection
(2) a. number certified leaves
b. man-days/man-years leave
(3) a. Article #160-number
b. man-days of leave
c. salaries paid therefore
1983 1980- 92 -
HE (1) Are following fringe benefits included in total pay and













(2) Overtime regulations are stipulated in Chapter III of
Part One of the Labor Code. What difficulties have
- you specifically encountered in their application?
Please be specific with respect to conflicting inter-
pretations of regulations for overtime during the week,
work on Saturdays and Sundays.
IIF (1) Please give information.on cases brought to court based
on the labor code:











1983 1980- 93 -
(2) What was the average amount of severence pay paid during







(3) Please list number of cases brought before labor courts
by basic reason referring thereby to specific article










and references)- 94 -
(4) What costs are incurred in paying lawyers for the cases?
If company lawyers are used, include all complementary





(5) If management and supervisory personnel are involved in
the Labor Cede cases - either in the company, in connec-
tions with ministries or in the courts - how many man-




We know the legal minimum wage was increased in the
following years. What was, after the increase, the
legal miniir.um wage in your firm? How many employees
had to have their wages increased because they other-
wise would have been below it and how many employees
had.their wages adjusted just to maintain their posi-







1982 1979 1974 1970- 95 -
IIH To find qualified personnel much time and effort must
be invested in search procedures. Since private em-
ployment agencies are not permitted in Panama the person-
nel department shoulders the burden. Please provide the
following information about your personnel department.
(1) Persons directly engaged in hiring/search matters:
1983 1980 1970
Number
(2) Total number of persons in personnel departinent:.
1983 1980 1970
Nunber




(4) How many persons started working and stopped working for
your company in the following years?
Number started
Number stopped
1983 1980 1970- 96 -
-Extra questions for manufacturing companies-




Value of physical capital assets (if possible economic




Value of intermediate inputs (raw material, components,
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